The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 20
Issue 4 December

Article 8

December 1993

Neighborhood-Based Initiative to Address Poverty: Lessons From
Experience
Robert Halpern
Erikson Institute, Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Inequality and Stratification Commons, and the Social Work Commons

Recommended Citation
Halpern, Robert (1993) "Neighborhood-Based Initiative to Address Poverty: Lessons From Experience,"
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 20 : Iss. 4 , Article 8.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol20/iss4/8

This Article is brought to you by the Western Michigan
University School of Social Work. For more information,
please contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

Neighborhood-Based Initiative to Address
Poverty: Lessons From Experience
ROBERT HALPERN
Erikson Institute
Chicago, Illinois
Neighborhood-Based Initiatives to Address Poverty
The neighborhood has long been an important locus for
efforts to address the causes and consequences of poverty in
American society. Over the course of the past century neighborhood-based initiatives have been called on to reduce class
conflict, counter feelings of alienation, localize control of social
institutions, create jobs and reverse neighborhood economic decline, improve human services, and address a variety of specific
poverty-related problems, ranging from infant mortality to juvenile delinquency. In this essay I draw on the historical experience with neighborhood initiative to illuminate its strengths
and limitations as a strategy for addressing poverty and its
correlates. I also use the particular history to point up enduring
dilemmas in American society's efforts to address poverty.
Neighborhood-level initiative has played an important role
in efforts to address poverty because it is consonant with the
ways in which Americans prefer to think about and deal with
poverty; that is, as an individually- and locally-rooted problem, a product of individual weakness or unhealthy community
environments, rather than inadequate wages, a changing labor
market, or exclusion from social and economic opportunities.
Poor people, separated from the basic social, economic, and
political contexts which shape their lives, "are presented as a
mere aggregation of personal cases, each with its own logic and
self-contained causes" (Wacquant & Wilson, 1989, p. 9). Certainly people who have had and continue to have difficult lives
do make more than their share of bad decisions-a residue of
such lives (Polansky, 1981). People eventually internalize social
neglect and depredation in their outlook and their behavior. But
too often the focus on individual or group responses to hardship
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and exclusion has served as an excuse for ignoring underlying
causes of poverty-related problems.
The preference for focusing on poverty and its correlates as
individual and local problems itself is due to a reluctance to
acknowledge that American society's collective economic and
social choices bear inherent costs-in hardship, inequality, and
marginality-as well as benefits. Acknowledging these costs
presumably would threaten the ideals and myths underlying
American culture. Americans therefore struggle to find
approaches to addressing hardship, inequality, and marginality
that allow basic myths to be maintained, for example that ours
is an open society with few impediments to social mobility.
Neighborhood initiative not only fits comfortably with our ideals and myths, it has been built on them.
American reformers since the Progressive era have believed
that the local community is the ground on which our society
could compensate for and counteract the costs inherent in its
priorities and arrangements. They have believed that the local
community can be different in values and dynamics than the
larger society in which it is embedded (Wiebe, 1975, ch. 6). Thus,
for example, it is presumed that in a society driven by selfinterest it is easier to identify common interests within a local
community. In an individualistic society, feelings of responsibility for others' well-being are stronger within a local community.
In other words, reformers have believed that something done in
the community can solve problems the larger society has been
unable or unwilling to resolve.
The historical experience with neighborhood initiative raises
doubts both about the ways in which Americans have preferred to deal with poverty, and the ways in which they have
used the idea of community. This experience suggests that poverty and social exclusion are not problems which local citizens
coming together can address on their own, especially if it is
only those citizens experiencing these problems. Neighborhood
initiatives have provided residents of poor neighborhoods a
voice in defining important issues in their lives, and a vehicle for acting in concert to gain a measure of control over
those issues. The services they have created have provided poor
people critical support in coping with poverty-related stresses.
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They have assumed leadership in municipal poverty-fighting
efforts. Too frequently, though, neighborhood initiatives have
been undermined by inappropriate social tasks, overly optimistic views of community, and ambivalence on the part of
government about community control in poor communities. Too
frequently, local and federal government has used the presence
of neighborhood initiatives as an implicit excuse for inaction on
larger issues, such as residential segregation. All too frequently
neighborhood initiatives have been undermined by the very
community depletion they were designed to address. Rather
than reshaping the larger social context, most initiatives have
been progressively shaped by it.
Herein lies a central dilemma of neighborhood initiative in
poor neighborhoods. Neglected and depleted local communities do not create themselves. They are created largely by the
decisions of others not to invest in, insure, support, or interact
with those communities and their residents; indeed often to
withdraw resources from those communities, and let existing
investments deteriorate. It is problematic to then turn around
and encourage these same communities to draw on the very
types of resources that have been depleted to renew themselves.
Under such conditions, neighborhood initiative becomes a false
choice, rather than a genuine one. Members of neglected and
depleted communities have not only chosen, they have had no
choice but to rely on their own efforts to counter the effects
of their exclusion. They have done do so in response to the
indifference of the larger society, in an effort not to let that
indifference destroy their communities. They have done so to
counter hopelessness and anger, and to secure a modicum of
self-determination.
The Emergence of Neighborhood Initiative
Neighborhood renewal emerged as a major problem solving
approach in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Progressives started out with a broad agenda, including regulation of
working conditions, tenement reform, women's suffrage, public health reform, and family preservation. Woven through the
specific elements of this agenda, and emerging over time as a
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central theme binding it together, was renewal of community.
When Progressives looked at poor neighborhoods they saw not
only horrendous living conditions, but conflict among religious
and ethnic groups, lack of neighborliness and lack of order.
They saw the poor as alienated from their work, their communities and each other (Kirschener, 1986, p. 179), and as unassimilated into society. Progressive reformers sought responses
to hardship and inequality that were not as moralistic as those
of the nineteenth century, that did not raise questions about
the basic tenets of American society, and that were neither too
trivial nor too radical as a response to poverty. They also needed
problem solving strategies that addressed the perceived decline
in social cohesion. Neighborhood initiative seemed well-suited
to all these objectives.
If the neighborhood was going to be "the unit of civic and
national reconstruction" (Robert Wood, cited in Chambers, 1963,
p. 116), something had to be created that symbolized and represented the neighborhood as a whole, and that had the means to
pull disparate elements together. The settlement, already emerging in many poor neighborhoods to provide specific services
to neighborhood residents, seemed well-suited to this purpose
(Chambers, 1963). Settlements' immediate attraction to the residents of poor immigrant neighborhoods was the wide variety
of services provided. Settlement leaders had a larger vision.
They wanted settlements to become neighborhood centers in
the broadest sense. They organized residents to push for improved neighborhood conditions, ranging from closed sewers
to public baths, to parks and playgrounds. They tried to use the
settlement as the vehicle for reconciling the diversity of group
beliefs, interests, and behavioral patterns that made up poor
neighborhoods (Daniels, 1920).
A notable exception to the settlements' efforts to promote
social integration involved African Americans, whom most settlements refused to serve (Philpott, 1978). By the early part of the
century, urban African Americans were already being residentially isolated from other groups, through restrictive covenants,
steering and violence. Nonetheless as more African Americans
moved north they overspilled the boundaries of black districts,
and many lived in the catchment areas of particular settlements.
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Settlement leaders supported the maintenance of the "color
line" when they could. When they found African Americans
in their neighborhoods they constructed elaborate rationales
not to serve them (Philpott, 1978, p. 301). They argued that
racial integration would lead to neighborhood conflict. They
argued that the whole aim of neighborhood work was to bring
people together voluntarily, and if one group objected there was
nothing to be done (Philpott, 1978, p. 311).
Aside from the issue of race, the settlements' efforts at neutrality and ecumenism limited their role in social problem-solving and community development. They were ambivalent about
the industrial strife of the period, identifying with workers but
refusing to acknowledge the roots of workers' grievances in
the basic premises of corporate capitalism (see Jane Addams'
reflections on George Pullman in "An American Lear", reproduced in Lasch, 1965). Settlements refused to acknowledge the
critical role that churches and mutual aid associations played
in immigrants' lives, further marginalizing them in neighborhoods in which they were often already viewed as outsiders.
Over time settlements' aspirations to reform society from the
bottom up weakened, as did the broader reform impulses of
the Progressive era. Nonetheless, settlements maintained their
role as social sentinal. They were among the first to sense and
warn of the coming Great Depression, though no one would
listen to their warnings (Hall, 1971, ch. 1).
During the early decades of the century other neighborhood-based strategies also emerged in poor neighborhoods. The
public schools experimented (briefly) with efforts to become
neighborhood service centers and development agencies (Fisher,
1977). As human services became more bureaucratized in the
1920s and 1930s, some cities developed local welfare or neighborhood councils, designed to assure local citizen input into service planning. Innovative neighborhood service models
emerged in a number of cities. Clifford Shaw's Chicago Area
Project, for example, tried to reduce juvenile delinquency by addressing the breakdown in community social controls thought
to nurture it. The Project recruited young adults from the community (some former delinquents) as "curbstone counselors",
to provide gang members the caring, feedback, guidance and
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monitoring that presumably had dissipated in the community
(Schlossman & Sedlak, 1983).
Also in Chicago, the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council (BYNC) was emerging as a prototype for community-wide
reform organizations. Originated by Joseph Meegan, a community leader, and Saul Alinsky, BYNC sought to mobilize the
Back of the Yards community around local priorities identified
through democratic processes (Slayton, 1986). Meegan's and
Alinsky's vision, though more militant than that of the settlement leaders, was in many respects just as pragmatic and
optimistic. They assumed that most people in a segmented
multi-ethnic community wanted a setting where they could
temporarily set aside their narrow interests in the service of
common interests, whether an Infant Welfare Station, a free
lunch program, better city services, or better access to mortgage
loans. The idea of mobilizing a segmented community by focusing on neglect or exploitation by outside institutions, and at
the same time setting clear, realistic objectives, would be central
to Alinsky's subsequent organizing work (Alinsky, 1970).
During the 1940s and 1950s there were also major shifts
occurring in urban community life. Manufacturing was leaving
inner-city neighborhoods for the suburbs, taking hundreds of
thousands of jobs with it. At the same time three million blacks
were making their way from the south to inner-city areas of
the north and midwest (Mollenkopf, 1983, p. 82). Local governments joined white neighborhood associations and real estate
interests in an effort to control the process of neighborhood
change; but such efforts could not withstand the pressure of the
enormous numbers involved. A rapid and sometimes violent
process of racial transition took place at the edges of expanding
black ghettos.
As whites fled inner-city neighborhoods the political relationship of those neighborhoods to municipal government
changed dramatically. Contracting urban resources provided
an excuse for decreased patronage and investment in schools,
police, sanitation, and infrastructure in both the historic ghetto
and newly black neighborhoods (Mollenkopf, 1983). A growing
proportion of absentee landlords saw little reason to maintain
properties in neighborhoods perceived to be declining anyway.
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Urban renewal, the predominant poverty-fighting strategy of
the era, became a tool to buffer city centers from the tide of
African American migration, and to reinforce territorial segregation through zoning, selection of transportation routes, and location of public housing (Fainstein & Fainstein, 1983). Hundreds
of thousands of poor people, mostly minorities, were relocated
from the viable living neighborhoods into other poor neighborhoods that soon themselves became overcrowded and overwhelmed (Gans, 1965). The federal highway program, which
displaced almost as many poor people as urban renewal, was
often used to cut off poor, minority communities from the rest
of the city (Mollenkopf, 1983). High rise public housing projects
became the anchor, locating, solidifying, and holding the ghettos in place as one after another of the major institutions of
society deserted them (Kotlowitz, 1991).
Responses: From Outside and From Within
The Ford Foundation felt impelled to respond to what was
happening in the cities with a program that provided both prototype and impetus for the unprecedented neighborhood initiatives of the 1960s. Ford Foundation staff, notably Paul Ylvisaker,
were frustrated by the unresponsiveness of predominant urban
institutions, notably municipal governments and schools, to the
support needs of the growing numbers of minority migrants
to the cities (Ford Foundation, 1964). They recognized, albeit
dimly, that there was growing anger in the inner-city about
the process and fruits of urban renewal, and that this anger had
to be contained and converted to something positive (Ylvisaker,
1973, pp. 19, 23). They were interested in a strategy broader than
one sector (e.g. school reform) and more substantive than Ford's
prevailing program of municipal government reorganization.
The motives for Gray Areas were nonetheless conservative
ones. Paul Ylvisaker and colleagues, like their progressive era
predecessors, believed that America's values, political and social system were essentially sound; they just sometimes needed
some "re-balancing" (Aaron & Hahn, 1991, p. 3). They, like
others at the time, had a fear of social disorder and a perception that it could only be prevented through greater equality
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(Kenniston, 1960). Not least, like the settlements, Gray Areas
was built on the presumption that mainstream institutions and
disenfranchised residents of poor neighborhoods had the same
interests but were frustrated by not knowing how to combine
their energies in a constructive process.
Gray Areas involved the infusion of relatively large amounts
of Ford Foundation money and some technical assistance into
a small number of cities-Boston, New Haven, Oakland, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C.-typically through a newly created,
private coordinating agency, and typically with a focus on one
or a few specific inner-city neighborhoods. These monies were
to be used in part to spur innovation in local social, health
and educational services, in part to finance the development
of a comprehensive neighborhood renewal plan that would
serve as the basis for attracting other funds for reform. The
local organizing agencies would avoid the trap of becoming
just another agency fighting for its prerogatives "by repudiating
any claim to permanence or direct control" (Marris & Rein,
1982, p. 284).
The New Haven Gray Areas program, under the auspices
of Community Progress Inc (CPI), was perhaps the best known
and most widely publicized. A small, tightly knit group of
professionals developed the plan, sold it to Ford, and ran the
program (Powledge, 1970). While community residents were involved in service provision, there was little citizen participation
in planning or governance. CPI's concern with New Haven's
inner-city community was "largely anticipatory and defensive,
a strategic posture rooted in the fear that the antipoverty project
would become embroiled in political controversy and fail to
accomplish its purpose" (Murphy, 1971, p. 119).
The New Haven program focused particularly on educational programs such as community schools, preschool education, community work experience for youth, lay teacher aides,
and home school coordinators; and corollary programs such as
after school programs, summer camps, and expanded neighborhood libraries (Murphy, 1971). It also developed employment
centers, and had a rent supplementation program. Program
leadership viewed it as "a pioneering effort, aiming at kind of a
comprehensive social plan that has never before been prepared
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(Murphy, 1971, p. 68). This was not quite true. The eclectic
mixture of services reflected a renewal of many earlier ideas.
More important, CPI was out of step with a growing demand
by inner-city community leaders for greater community participation in program planning and management (Powledge, 1970,
p. 142).
At the same time that Ford was funding Gray Areas two
other initiatives were developing that would provide conceptual
foundations for community action, the programmatic centerpiece of the decade. The President's Council on Juvenile Delinquency (PCJD) funded demonstrations in 16 cities, focused on
breaking the poverty cycle at the point just before youth were
lost to the streets, primarily through education programs, and
some street corner social work reminiscent of the Chicago Area
Project of the 1930s. The PCJD program ran into many of the
same local obstacles as did the Gray Areas projects, including
demands for greater community participation, and local school
bureaucracies resistant to even modest reforms.
The other initiative, Mobilization for Youth (MFY), originated at the Henry Street settlement in New York, was charting
a different course than Gray Areas and PCJD. The designers of
MFY believed that prevailing social institutions needed reform
more than did poor people. Strategically, they believed that
cooperation would only lead to cooptation, and thus assumed
a more aggressive approach to reform (Marris & Rein, 1982).
They were also committed to letting poor people themselves
define the MFY agenda, although within a framework of professional guidance. MFY did sometimes try to persuade established institutions, including schools and welfare offices, to be
more responsive to community residents. For example, MFY
staff helped organize a group of Puerto Rican mothers to press
for modest reforms in their children's school, including more
flexible scheduling of parent-teacher meetings, and permission
to take books home (Marris & Rein, 1982, p. 67). When efforts
to persuade broke down, MFY encouraged neighborhood residents to turn to protest and demand on mainstream institutions,
and helped develop the protest strategies (Cloward & Ellman,
1973). MFY's effort to raise the stakes of local reform made it
a variety of enemies, including some who had started out as
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allies (Hall, 1971, p. 274). The program eventually stabilized as
an important community institution. In its difficult early history
it left a number of lessons that should have been but were not
digested by those designing the coming War on Poverty.
Community Action
Miller and Rein (1973) note that many of our social reform
movements are stories of the compromises that have to be made
to mobilize support for reform in the U.S. context. The War on
Poverty, in which a structural analysis of poverty by senior
government officials, focusing on unequal access to jobs, was
converted into a primarily service-based strategy, was certainly
one such story (Katz, 1989). The conversion was facilitated by
the enormous financial costs and political constraints to a major
public sector job creation program. It was furthered by the
availability of prototypes for a neighborhood-based strategy.
As it emerged, the War on Poverty had two thrusts: equal
opportunity and community action (Katz, 1989). The first was
reflected in specific health, education, social service, and job
training programs intended to help poor children, youth, and
to a lesser extent adults become prepared to take advantage of
"new" opportunities. The other, community action, was built
on the idea of strengthening poor communities' own ability
to meet their residents' needs (or at least assure those needs
were met). This would be done through two strategies. First,
established institutions and the new Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) programs would come together in a reform
coalition that would adopt a common strategy for improving
community members' well-being. Second, community members
would take a significant role in determining the priorities and
activities of the local "War on Poverty". This latter was referred
to as the principle of maximum feasible participation. A new
institution, the community action agency (CAA), was created to
embody and implement these ideas. The CAAs' authority and
leverage consisted of control over the grants for some of the
new OEO direct service programs, and the influence embodied
in their boards, which were supposed to include representatives
of different segments of the community.
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The principle of maximum feasible participation was a
broad idea that resonated strongly with basic American beliefs.
Nonetheless, OEO never defined what it meant by the term.
It was probably intended to mean advisement by community
residents in local planning and decision-making coalitions, and
employment of poor people in helping roles vis a vis their
neighbors and peers. There was an assumption that participation was inherently good both for poor people and for society.
It would improve poor people's mental health by countering
their sense of alienation; and it would strengthen democracy.
It was certainly not viewed in the early OEO discussions as a
vehicle for increasing the political power of formerly powerless
groups. But that is what it became.
Efforts to clarify the meaning of participation were reflected
in battles over representation on CAA boards. Established interests, especially local city halls and major human service institutions, quickly mobilized to take control of the boards. Partly in
response, Congress passed legislation requiring that one third
of each CAA board be made up of representatives of the poor.
Gaining a measure of control over CAA boards also became
a focus of the civil rights organizers and militant community
leaders (Morone, 1990). Most neighborhood residents continued to feel unrepresented throughout the battles over governance. As CAAs resolved internal issues they moved on to face
equally difficult questions about their purpose, role, authority
and legitimacy in the local community. One putative task of
the CAAs was coordination of the general poverty-fighting effort in a community. In this they were hampered by limited
resources, an unclear mandate, and by the fact that they were
a new, externally-created institution. For example, the CAAs
were never really able to gain a role in community economic
development, an indigenous movement that was becoming a
principal engine of development in inner-city communities.
The CAAs struggled particularly with issues of authority
and role in the area of human service coordination and reform. As private agencies they had no authority, and only
such legitimacy as resided in their boards, to take the lead
in coordinating community services. With respect to reform,
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there was a tendency to try to have it both ways-to ask established institutions to work with them, and simultaneously
to pressure them to reform. Community Action Agencies often
found themselves organizing community residents to demand
reform of the very institutions-schools, welfare departments,
housing authorities-that they were trying to bring together in
a common strategy to improve the community.
Over time, most community action agencies settled on a cooperative rather than confrontational stance, scaled down their
ambitions, and began seeking a defensible niche in their communities. In this they were helped along by the Office of Economic Opportunity, which, responding to the lack of clarity
in CAA purposes, and to the tendency for some CAAs to use
federal funds to support militant actions against established
powerholders in their cities, began to seek greater control over
local community action programs. It did so by earmarking an increasing proportion of community action funds for national priority programs, converting many CAAs primarily into grantees
for specific programs such as Head Start, community health
centers, and Job Corps.
In the end, the results of the community action strategy
were mixed. In addition to providing a local base for new
neighborhood-based services, community action created or
stimulated the creation of new affiliations and organizations,
including single-issue coalitions, tenant organizations, legal services, public interest law firms, and various rights organizations.
These new groups and organizations gave poor people critical
support in coping with poverty-related stresses, and a voice
in at least some the issues shaping their lives. They came to
play a critical role in securing and protecting the rights of poor
children and families against the unchecked discretion of the
public service and public assistance bureaucracies. The opportunity afforded to community members to assume key staff and
advisory roles planted the seed for the eventual emergence of
a black municipal bureaucracy. Not least, community action
brought people together who would not normally have come
together, leading to dialogue, new relationships, and occasionally to coalition-building.
Community action as a strategy was nonetheless limited
in critical ways. It faced an inherent dilemma in its strategic
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focus within the boundaries of poor neighborhoods themselves.
Community action was developing during a period of worsening residential segregation in most cities. Many moderate
black leaders were beginning to see the goal of integration as
a chimera, and therefore supported the strategy of "separate
development" as a necessary alternative (Altsbuler, 1970). But
while an internal orientation made immediate sense, it could not
address the problem of community neglect by major social and
economic institutions, including banks and large corporations;
nor residents' growing exclusion from mainstream social and
economic opportunities.
Community action was further undermined by the halfhearted support of its own sponsor. When residents of poor
communities finally began to take the federal government up
on its offer, and attempted to define community action on their
own terms, the federal government began backing away from
its commitments to them. When the poor in a particular community did manage to achieve a tactical victory on a key local
issue they received little support from OEO in building on such
achievement to develop a constructive program of local action.
Established institutions and service agencies "transformed the
institutional change strategy to guarantee their own survival by
redirecting the focus onto the client group and away from the
institutional order" (Rose, 1972, p. 148).
Morone (1990, p. 250) argues that in the community action
program "the state mediated the tension between the need for
action and its inability to undertake it by organizing a program
grounded in a potent myth". That was the myth of a coherent,
like-minded community mobilizing itself for its common good.
In reality it proved impossible in most instances to build the
common interest around which to pull together the diverse
segments of local communities. Indeed it has been argued that
in community action and related programs, as well as broader
events of the 1960s, "revealed a national style that was sectarian, not pragmatic. When Americans encountered problems
they looked not for the common ground but for the boundary
dividing it" (Wiebe, 1975, p. 8). To the residents of poor neighborhoods, the participatory structures and process set up by
community action yielded little compared both to the promises
made and the turmoil engendered.
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Model Cities
During the late 1960s the residual federal government interest in addressing poverty shifted to a new initiative that was
to be implemented through the very political structures-local
governments-that community action had been designed to
by-pass. Model Cities was legislated into being in 1966 and
administered by the new Department of Housing and Urban
Development. It's purpose was to strengthen local governments'
commitment and ability to rehabilitate inner-city neighborhoods, through careful planning and centralized coordination.
Model Cities was to be community development decoupled
from community action, particularly its more militant aspects.
Nonetheless, the social, political and institutional context for
reform was profoundly different than it had been just a few
years earlier.
Anger and frustration was at a much higher level in innercity neighborhoods. Poor people and their local leadership were
increasingly disillusioned by a sense of unfulfilled promises and
betrayal by both the federal and local governments. They had
learned that public and private resources for poor communities
"come with a price tag that virtually never leaves local goals
unchanged" (Perry, 1985, p. 16). They had also learned that "in
a coalition form of decision-making, such as the Community
Action Boards... they could be outmaneuvered and outvoted
by more powerful interests" (Warren, 1969, p. 248). They were
unwilling to let themselves be outmaneuvered once again. Established institutions positioned themselves carefully to gain a
piece of the new pie, without becoming embroiled in struggles over priority-setting and organizational structures. Finally,
both mayors and Congress wanted to be sure of control over
the program.
Cities interested in a Model Cities grant had to develop
an elaborate plan, that included most or all existing human
service agencies or programs. The plan was to be developed by a
newly created body called a City Demonstration Agency (CDA),
composed of elected officials, representatives of major agencies
like the schools, local housing authorities, health and welfare,
employment, civic, labor and business leaders. The CDA was
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supposed to be under the authority of the elected city council
and the mayor, who had veto power over any plans developed.
In many respects, Model Cities was set up to minimize rather
than maximize the governance roles of residents of the target
neighborhoods. The guidelines developed by HUD interpreted
the citizen participation requirements in the legislation to mean
only that citizens have access to the decision-making process
(Arnstein, 1971). There was a tendency for the planning process
to be tightly held, with plans voted on by the city council before
the poor could mobilize. This was sometimes due to time pressure, as the program priorities set in Washington kept shifting.
Nonetheless, power-sharing with residents tended to occur primarily when organized protest by target neighborhood citizen
groups threatened to block planning or program monies from
HUD to a particular city, as in Philadelphia; or when local government chose to work through a neighborhood corporation, as
in New Haven. In a few cities, groups representing the poor
turned to the courts to enforce citizen participation provisions.
One key principle of Model Cities was supposed to be concentration of federal and local resources in the targeted poor
neighborhoods. In reality there was a strong tendency for resources committed to Model Cities by the schools, housing authority, and other agencies to be re-absorbed by those agencies,
through the technique of defining needed services as what they
already provided. Other federal programs that were supposed
to pitch in withheld their resources till it became too late to use
them. A second key principle, coordination, also became a kind
of shell game (Gardner, 1989).
A portion of Model Cities monies were intended to be used
for an updated attempt at urban renewal, this time with a more
serious focus on increasing the supply of decent housing for
poor families. But while the idea of urban renewal had been
updated, the politics of urban renewal had not been. Non-profit
housing and community development agencies that attempted
to take advantage of HUD's interest found little support from
local urban renewal boards and commissions, which still tended
to be controlled by large real estate and construction interests,
and to be susceptible to pressure from residents of wealthy
neighborhoods. Ideas such as scatter-site housing and building
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code reform rarely made it through local legislative or regulatory processes. Within a few months of his election President
Nixon declared the "urban crisis" over (Haar, 1975, p. 193). At
the same time that its coverage was being expanded from about
75 to 150 cities, largely for political purposes, its funding was
being cut from $500 million to about $300 million. Within a few
years Model Cities was off the Nixon administration's social
policy agenda.
Community Development Corporations:
A Different Approach, ConstrainedAll the Same
Of all the neighborhood-based poverty-fighting strategies
that have evolved in the United States community economic
development is the most direct and powerful. It is also one
of the few that was not imposed on poor communities, but
grew out of their own efforts to define their needs. That is why
its relatively modest effects (Carlson & Martinez, 1988, p. 292)
are so instructive. The idea of community economic development, as embodied in the community development corporations
(CDCs), emerged in the mid-1960s out of a growing conviction
among community leaders that the economic renewal of their
communities was of little concern to the private sector or to
government (Perry, 1987). It was also motivated by belief that
the anger being expressed in urban riots, as often turned inward as outward, had to be re-directed into constructive activity
if inner-city communities were to survive. Most of the early
CDCs were locally-created, community-owned institutions. A
few, such as The Woodlawn Organization and Philadelphia's
Opportunities Industrialization Center, started out as protest
organizations. In the late 1960s the federal government became
involved in stimulating and supporting CDCs, through OEO,
the Small Business Administration, and later through the Community Services Administration. By the late 1970s the Ford
Foundation became involved, through the Local Initiative Support Corporation (LISC).
The first generation of CDCs were relatively large organizations, often involved in planning and overseeing sizable
commercial projects, such as a shopping center; and in efforts to
bring some manufacturing back to the inner-city. They also took
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equity stakes in or purchased businesses that otherwise would
have closed down (Carlson & Martinez, 1988; Faux, 1971). These
early CDCs were modestly successful in attracting private capital back to inner-city communities. They generated a modest
number of local jobs. In both their projects and their own offices
they provided a training ground for minority bankers, planners,
accountants and so forth. About half the businesses they helped
create or maintain became profitable, at least for a time (Perry,
1987). But the depleted state of many inner-city communities
by the late 1960s and early 1970s, often compounded by the
destruction of businesses through looting and arson during
the riots, strongly constrained the early CDC experience. The
efforts of even the best-capitalized and managed CDCs, such as
the Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, were dwarfed
by "the basic patterns of deterioration in the community, in
terms of broad measures of joblessness, poverty levels, or housing and community infrastructure decay" (Carlson & Martinez,
1988, p. 292).
Over time both the surviving older CDCs and hundreds of
newly emergent ones became smaller, more opportunistic, and
more pragmatic. In general CDCs shifted more toward building
or rehabilitating housing (80 percent of new low-cost housing
in Boston is CDC built); and putting together private loan pools
(funded by private individuals, foundations, churches, and the
like, sometimes guaranteed by government agencies) in order to
make mortgage or other capital loans to business ventures that
were too high-risk to secure regular bank loans (Pearce & Steinbach, 1987). When later CDCs embarked on a business venture
it was likely to be small, providing fewer but more sustainable
jobs than in the past, by filling a specialized niche in the local
economy-a bakery, a catering service, or a roofing firm.
CDCs also became less likely over time to take a confrontational stand on contentious issues such as bank lending
practices or how crucial zoning decisions are made (Pearce &
Steinbach, 1987, p. 32). By and large CDCs have opted for a
cooperative approach in their projects, appealing to the selfinterest of established institutions, and when possible bringing
those institutions in as partners. It is not clear if the CDCs'
new partners will stay the course. Historically investors in CDC
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projects have had to be extraordinarily patient to see even very
low returns.
The CDC movement also has not yet resolved the basic tensions between the objectives of nurturing successful businesses
and entrepeneurs and redeveloping inner-city communities. For
example, should profits be invested back in the business, or used
for some general community purpose? Should businesses hire
only community residents, even if they lacked the skills needed
for a particular job? Should the management evict the resident
of a CDC building who could not keep up with his or her
rent? These are philosophical questions, reflecting the tensions
between the demands of capitalism and those of community
(see Gunn & Gunn, 1991). But they also reflect the cruel choices
created in forcing neglected communities to take responsibility
for renewing themselves.
A New Generation of Neighborhood-Based Initiatives
The process of social and economic disinvestment in innercity communities that began in the 1950s only slowed modestly
during the 1960s and 1970s, and has since intensified. During
the 1970s and 1980s hundreds of thousands of jobs were lost
from central city areas (Kasarda, 1989). Little effort was made
to maintain the older housing stock of central cities, nor such
public institutions as schools and hospitals. Cities received a
declining share of federal spending. With the loss of the local tax
base, the continuing constriction of municipal budgets, and the
outmigration of remaining middle class families, inner-city communities no longer had the resources to support the full range
of social, religious, and economic institutions that are critical to
daily living and that provide the paths toward social mobility
(Wacquant & Wilson, 1989). For example, local churches no
longer generated the resources to provide educational, social
and recreational programs.
After having observed the well-being of poor minority families and the fabric of their neighborhoods deteriorate over the
past decade, city governments, foundations, and increasingly
the business community, have once again become interested in
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efforts to address that deterioration. Much of the renewed attack
on persistent poverty is going into programs designed implicitly
or explicitly to help individual families escape the inner-city,
through education, job training, assistance in finding jobs, and
so forth. Nonetheless, the idea of renewing and strengthening
inner-city communities is once again receiving at least modest
attention.
Casey, Commonwealth, Ford, Mott, Rockefeller, and numerous community foundations have local or multi-city neighborhood renewal initiatives in various stages of development. For
instance, the Ford Foundation is sponsoring a four-city (Detroit, Hartford, Memphis, Milwaukee) demonstration called the
"Neighborhood and Family Initiative". New York City has two
initiatives on the drawing board. Its Human Resource Administration recently proposed "The New Citi Plan", a five year
demonstration project "to facilitate community renewal and empowerment" in inner-city neighborhoods (Reed & Bennett, 1990,
p. 1). A growing movement for comprehensive human service
reform in many states and cities builds on the notion of the
neighborhood as the locus of a reconceptualized system of services. For example, New York State has begun a demonstration
called the "Neighborhood-Based Initiative", which will focus
initially on crisis intervention services and comprehensive case
management, but will expand to include a variety of "neighborhood revitalization" activities.
The current generation of neighborhood-based initiatives is
focusing relatively more on the integrated nature of neighborhood renewal than did its predecessors. Proponents recognize
that it is hard to talk a small businessman or woman into opening a business in a neighborhood full of abandoned buildings;
or to convince a child to stick with schooling if no one that
child knows has a regular job. At the same time, recognizing the
growing difficulty of obtaining outside "concessions, subsidies
and investments", sponsors of current initiatives have kept the
general ideas of mobilizing community residents on their own
behalf and of bringing together diverse local stakeholders to act
in concert at the heart of their agendas (Kretzman, undated).
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Issues For Current and Future Initiatives

The history reviewed here offers some discrete lessons and
raises basic questions about reliance on neighborhood initiative
to address problems of poverty, inequality and social exclusion.
The social and economic context of neighborhood initiatives in
poor, isolated neighborhoods creates a variety of dilemmas with
respect to both purpose and strategy. Neighborhood initiatives
seem to have been most successful when they have managed
to maintain a balance, a middle ground, between the poles of
these dilemmas.
Perhaps the central dilemma in neighborhood initiative is
what Minow (1990) calls the "difference dilemma", the question
of how to address one's social depredation and social exclusion.
On the one hand, it is not possible to solve these problems
by striving to create a separate local society. Indeed focusing
on separate development implies a degree of acceptance of the
permanent nature of one's exclusion. On the other hand, efforts
to integrate into the larger society offer "no solution unless the
majority itself changes by sharing power, accepting members
of the minority as equal participants, and resisting the temptation to attribute as personal inadequacies the legacy of disadvantage experienced by the group (Minow, 1990, p. 25). This
dilemma finds expression-and therefore has to be attended
to-in almost all aspects of neighborhood work in poor urban
neighborhoods. It has been expressed as a tension between
whether to focus more on community-building or on addressing
inequality. It has been expressed as a tension between reconciliation and confrontation and between pragmatic and more
radical aims.
A different type of dilemma in neighborhood initiative in
poor neighborhoods has been between concern for individual
progress and concern for community development. Community
economic development in particular has struggled with whether
it should and can be an ideological alternative to capitalism.
Some of those involved with the movement have struggled to
find a middle ground, arguing that individual and community
success should be viewed as interdependent. Nonetheless, local
experiments with alternative approaches to economic relations,
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such as cooperatives, have proven difficult to sustain, in part
because the larger social environment continues to seek out and
recognize individual achievement.
Still a third dilemma in neighborhood initiative has been
how much to build an initiative on the presumption that beyond
the disparate interests of those holding and those seeking power
there is an overarching common interest; and that this common
interest can serve as a basis for mutual trust. Certainly the
experiences of neighborhood initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s
do not support these presumptions. People from outside disenfranchised communities and people from inside rarely were
willing to take the risks necessary to gain each other's trust.
Those who came to the negotiating table already controlling
decisions, access and resources often remained unconvinced of
the wisdom of relinquishing these prerogatives or resources
to those who claimed they represented disenfranchised community members. Clearly there was a strong measure of selfinterest in their reluctance. But there were also questions about
whether the representatives of the powerless really had the common interests of the community in mind. Those who came to
the table to fight for the interests of neighborhood residents also
often came with a good deal of mistrust regarding the intentions
of established interests. This mistrust was often reinforced by
ensuing events.
At a basic level, if they are to be sustainable as a discrete
problem-solving strategy, future neighborhood initiatives will
have to be more realistic about what can and cannot be accomplished by just focusing reform efforts within poor neighborhoods themselves. Current initiatives still appear to be making
unrealistic claims, in part to secure necessary support. There
are sound rationales for neighborhood-based initiative. Diverse
problems and social issues tend to intersect at the local level,
and often can be more directly addressed at that level (Hunter,
1983). Neighborhood initiatives have been distinct in their understanding of social, economic and political concerns as linked,
and in their struggle to address these concerns together. There
are many untapped strengths, energies and resources within
inner-city communities. Residents' energies should be focused
within the community to some extent, and their contributions
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to the community should be legitimized and recognized, for
example counting as legitimate activity in programs that tie
receipt of public assistance to some kind of effort (Herr &
Halpern, 1991).
Nonetheless, neighborhood initiative has to be supported
in the context of an understanding that poor, isolated neighborhoods cannot be transformed, nor the life chances of their
residents significantly improved, by focusing reform just within
the neighborhood itself. Most of the problems that plague poor
neighborhoods and their residents-the continued sanctioning
of residential segregation, lack of employment opportunities,
the inadequacy of public assistance in meeting basic needs, lack
of health care, poor schools-are not purely "neighborhood"
concerns. They are the priorities and arrangements of society
as reflected in a particular locale. Those responsible for social
problem solving cannot just consider a local community without
considering the broad social forces shaping it. The beliefs, priorities, and practices of people and institutions rooted outside
poor neighborhoods have a profound effect on the quality life
within them.
Conclusion
The American preference for addressing poverty and its correlates through neighborhood-based initiatives has left a mixed
legacy. The institutional reforms and the new resources, opportunities, and services associated with neighborhood initiatives have tempered the hardship and despair resulting from
societal disinvestment in poor neighborhoods and poor people.
Nonetheless, the historic experience indicates that it is an ameliorative, not a transforming, problem solving strategy. Neighborhood initiative invariably has left the relationship between
poor neighborhoods and the rest of society unchanged. Indeed,
the reliance on neighborhood initiatives has reinforced an American tendency to label and separate out poor neighborhoods and
their residents, to think of them as an exception to rather than
an integral part of the larger society.
Poor, physically deteriorated and socially isolated neighborhoods don't create themselves. To some extent they are the
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product of Americans' instinctive mobility, as those with resources move on to the next, presumably better, place. To a
major extent they are the product of deliberate, short-sighted
and sometimes discriminatory business practices, a laissez faire
culture, and a reluctant government. In these and other ways
poor neighborhoods are tied to the society surrounding them, if
only as byproducts. Reform initiatives of the future have to take
these connections into account. At a minimum, neighborhoodbased initiative should not continue to be cast as a broad enough
problem solving strategy to excuse governmental and private
sector inaction on many other fronts.
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